Outcome Report of Roundtable on International Investment Regime and Access to Justice by Chan, Michelle et al.
Columbia Law School 
Scholarship Archive 
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
Staff Publications Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
9-2018 
Outcome Report of Roundtable on International Investment 
Regime and Access to Justice 
Michelle Chan 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment 
Kanika Gupta 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development 
Jesse Coleman 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, jcoleman@law.columbia.edu 
Kaitlin Y. Cordes 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Development, kaitlin.cordes@law.columbia.edu 
Lise Johnson 
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, ljj2107@columbia.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs 
 Part of the Antitrust and Trade Regulation Commons, Business Organizations Law Commons, Dispute 
Resolution and Arbitration Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law 
Commons, International Law Commons, International Trade Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, 
and the Transnational Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Michelle Chan, Kanika Gupta, Jesse Coleman, Kaitlin Y. Cordes & Lise Johnson, Outcome Report of 
Roundtable on International Investment Regime and Access to Justice, (2018). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/147 
This Memo/Briefing Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Columbia Center on Sustainable 
Investment at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Columbia Center on Sustainable 







Working Group on the issue of human rights and 




Impacts of the International Investment Regime on 
Access to Justice 
 
 







The Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI), a joint center of Columbia Law School and the 
Earth Institute at Columbia University, is the only university-based applied research center and forum 
dedicated to the study, practice, and discussion of sustainable international investment worldwide. Its 
mission is to develop practical approaches for governments, investors, communities, and other 
stakeholders to maximize the benefits of international investment for sustainable development, while 
minimizing the potential harms that can accompany large-scale investment projects. CCSI works at the 
nexus of international investment law and human rights law, and at the project-level and contract-level 
on the human rights impacts of investment projects. We conduct robust research; develop accessible 












The UN Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other 
business enterprises (“UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights”), established by the 
Human Rights Council in June 2011, consists of five independent experts of balanced geographical 
representation. Upon establishment, the Human Rights Council requested the Working Group to pursue a 
range of objectives, including: implementation of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights; 
exploration of options for enhancing access to effective remedy for business-related human rights 
violations; development of regular dialogue with all relevant actors; and guidance of the annual United 
Nations Forum on Business and Human Rights. In June 2017 at its thirty-fifth session (in resolution 35/7), 








On October 18, 2017, the UN Working Group on Business and Human Rights (Working Group) and 
the Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment (CCSI) hosted a one-day roundtable on the impacts 
of the international investment regime on access to justice for investment-affected individuals and 
communities.   
 
Held at Columbia University in New York, the roundtable brought together 32 individuals from civil 
society organizations, communities affected by investments at the heart of investor-state claims, 
governments, academia, donor organizations, UN mandate holders, and other stakeholder groups. 
The roundtable provided an opportunity for participants to: (i) explore and assess the specific 
impacts of international investment agreements and investor-state dispute settlement on access to 
justice, both within and outside the investment regime; (ii) discuss and analyze options for reform of 
the international investment regime and improvement of human rights enforcement mechanisms to 
determine whether they address the specific impacts explored; and (iii) identify a preliminary set of 
recommendations to address implications of the current investment regime for access to justice. 
Following the roundtable, key takeaways from the discussion were discussed during a session at the 
6th UN Forum on Business and Human Rights on November 29th, 2017.1   
 
For the Working Group, the roundtable constituted the first of several consultations it will be holding 
as part of its efforts to provide advice and guidance to states on how to “maintain adequate policy 
space to meet their human rights obligations when pursuing business-related policy objectives with 
other states or business enterprises” under Principle 9 of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights. The roundtable took place shortly after the Working Group presented its 2017 report 
to the UN General Assembly.2 The report examines the issue of effective remedies from the 
perspectives of rights holders and proposes that remedial mechanisms should be responsive to the 
diverse experiences and expectations of rights holders. Discussions at the roundtable built upon the 
issues examined in the report.   
 
For CCSI, exploring and addressing the implications of the investment regime for access to justice 
forms a critical component of two projects the Center is currently undertaking: the first seeks to 
examine the impact of investor-state arbitration on access to justice in the context of land-based 
investments, while the second is geared toward advancing new thinking on international investment 
agreements, including ways of aligning these agreements with sustainable development objectives. 
The takeaways from this roundtable will inform CCSI’s work on these issues. CCSI also aims to use 
roundtable discussions to inform input into investor-state arbitration reform processes currently 
underway in national, plurilateral, and multilateral fora.  
                                                     
1 Further information about this session can be found on CCSI’s website: http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2017/11/29/un-forum-
on-business-and-human-rights-session-on-realizing-access-to-remedy-implications-of-the-international-investment-
regime/.  
2 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
UN Doc A/72/162 (July 18, 2017). Available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/72/162. More 
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The roundtable discussion took place under Chatham House Rule, and this outcome document is 
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The International Investment Regime and Access to Justice 
 
This outcome document synthesizes key takeaways from a roundtable discussion that sought to 
explore the impacts of the international investment regime on access to justice for investment-
affected individuals and communities. Drawing on the plenary and breakout discussions that took 
place during this one-day, multi-stakeholder roundtable, the document pulls together and highlights 
central themes that ran throughout the discussion. It first outlines core concepts and introductory 
points that framed much of the roundtable discussion. The second section provides an overview of 
impacts of the investment regime on access to justice highlighted by roundtable participants. The 
third section outlines recommendations discussed by participants regarding reform of the 
investment regime and strengthening of human rights enforcement. While these recommendations 
focus in particular on addressing the impacts of the investment regime on access to justice, they are 
relevant to broader discussions regarding reform and improvement of both the investment and 
human rights regimes.  
 
1. Framing the Discussion    
 
(a) The International Investment Regime  
 
The international investment regime consists of more than 3,300 investment treaties, including both 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs) and free trade agreements (FTAs) with investment chapters. 
These agreements are typically asymmetric in nature: they establish a range of protections for 
covered investors, usually multinational enterprises (MNEs), which entail obligations for states 
parties, while not imposing any direct human rights obligations on investors. State obligations under 
these agreements can, in most cases, be enforced by means of investor-state arbitration (which is 
often referred to as investor-state dispute settlement, or ISDS), which provides MNEs with unique 
access to remedy at the international level. To date, investors have lodged more than 800 known 
treaty-based investor-state claims. MNEs have relied upon investor-state arbitration to challenge 
state decisions, policies, and measures adopted in pursuit of public interest objectives, including, for 
example: legislation requiring plain packaging for tobacco products; regulations adopted for 
protection of the environment (including water sources); court decisions holding companies liable 
for harms to private individuals and communities; and measures adopted to address local opposition 
to investment projects.  
 
Largely due to the concerns regarding the high costs of investor-state arbitration and the restrictions 
placed by the investment regime on the right – or duty – of states to regulate in the public interest, a 
range of stakeholders have been advocating for reform of the current investment regime. A number 
of states have already begun to take action: some have sought to revise investment treaty standards 
to better protect their ability to regulate; others have advanced new approaches to investment 
promotion, protection, and dispute settlement; others still have withdrawn from the international 
investment regime entirely.   
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While these reforms have been the subject of broad and ongoing public debate for several years, the 
actual or potential impacts of the international investment regime on access to justice for investment-
affected individuals and communities have received less attention in discourse and action on reform 
at the global, regional, and national levels.  
 
(b) Unpacking “Access to Justice” 
 
Access to justice and the right to an effective remedy form a core component of state obligations 
under human rights law.3 Providing equal access to justice for all is also a stated target of the 
universally adopted Sustainable Development Goals. In the context of business activities, ensuring 
access to effective remedy has been deemed essential, forming one of the three pillars of the UN 
Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (UN Guiding Principles). Yet, victims of business-
related human rights abuses often face both legal and practical barriers to accessing justice and 
obtaining effective remedies. In recent years, several initiatives have sought to highlight and address 
these barriers. In November 2014, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights 
(OHCHR) launched its Accountability and Remedy Project, which sought solutions to overcome 
obstacles undermining the effectiveness of judicial mechanisms in achieving corporate 
accountability and access to remedy in the context of business-related human rights abuses.4 The 
project led to the publication of guidance for states on improving judicial mechanisms at the domestic 
level.5 Addressing barriers to accountability and effective remedy for business-related human rights 
abuses has also been central to discussions on the development of an international legally binding 
instrument to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
with respect to human rights.6  
 
                                                     
3 For this meeting, we focus primarily on access to justice as a broad concept that includes access (and the right) to effective 
remedy. Access to justice and access/the right to (effective) remedy are slightly different concepts that have sometimes 
been used interchangeably. Both the “right to an effective remedy” and “effective access to justice” have been codified in 
human rights treaties (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights – ICCPR – and the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities – CRPD – respectively), although the former has more conceptual clarity as a right imposing 
both procedural and substantive duties on States. Access to justice, on the other hand, has been described as more narrow, 
more broad, or essentially comparable to the right to effective remedy. For a further discussion of the terminology, see 
Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
UN Doc A/72/162 (July 18, 2017), paras 13-17.  
4 See UN OHCHR Accountability and Remedy Project at < 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Business/Pages/OHCHRstudyondomesticlawremedies.aspx>.  
5 Report of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Improving Accountability and Access to Remedy for Victims of 
Business-Related Human Rights Abuse,” UN Doc A/HRC/32/19 (May 2016) < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/A_HRC_32_19_AEV.pdf>; Improving 
accountability and access to remedy for victims of business-related human rights abuse: Explanatory Notes for Guidance, 
UN Doc A/HRC/32/19/Add.1 (May 2016) < 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/DomesticLawRemedies/A_HRC_32_19_Add.1_AEV.pdf>.  
6 Open-ended intergovernmental working group on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect 
to human rights <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Pages/IGWGOnTNC.aspx>.  Since the 
roundtable took place, the following has been published: a paper outlining “Elements for the Draft Legally Binding 
Instrument on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights” was published, 
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/LegallyBindingInstrumentTNCs_OB
Es.pdf>; and a zero draft of a legally binding instrument to regulate, in international human rights law, the activities of 
transnational corporations and other business enterprises 
<https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf>. 
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The Working Group has also given more specific attention to this issue recently. Access to effective 
remedy was the theme of the Working Group’s 2017 report, which was presented to the UN General 
Assembly just prior to the October 18 roundtable.7 It was also the overall theme of the 2017 UN 
Forum on Business and Human Rights (27-29 November 2017), which the Working Group guides 
and chairs.  
 
To help frame the roundtable discussion, one participant provided an overview of the Working 
Group’s 2017 report, and highlighted the differing conceptual approaches adopted by the human 
rights community in referring to access to remedy, justice, and accountability. The participant 
explained that the Working Group’s report seeks to provide greater conceptual clarity regarding the 
different terms used in the literature and discourse on access to remedy. The report also underscores 
the idea that rights holders should be central to the remedy process, and makes the case that the right 
to remedy should be the lens through which all three pillars of the UN Guiding Principles should be 
seen. According to the report, the right to an effective remedy has two core elements: process and 
outcome. In other words, having merely access to effective remedy is not sufficient without an 
effective remedy at the end of the process.8  
 
The Working Group’s report is grounded in the notion that rights holders must be central to the entire 
remedy process, as they are the ones who suffer harm from business-related human rights abuses. 
To this end, rights holders must not be seen as a single group, but diverse in background and 
experiences, with different expectations regarding access to remedy and the meaning of “effective” 
remedy. The report points out that no single remedy makes a remedy effective in every case, and that 
a full range of remedies should be available to rights holders at the same time (i.e. “bouquet of 
remedies”).9 These remedies should be deterrent, preventative, and redressive, and can be located in 
diverse settings.10 The Working Group’s report also highlights that rights holders currently do not 
inform the remedy process, and often fear criminalization when seeking remedies.11 As noted further 
below, during the roundtable discussion that followed these introductory remarks, several 
roundtable participants shared stories of specific instances of criminalization or repression of 
community members and their allies seeking justice in the context of investment-related human 
rights abuses. 
  
2. Actual or Potential Impacts of the Investment Regime   
 
The first roundtable session took stock of the actual and potential impacts of investment treaties and 
investor-state arbitration on access to justice for investment-affected rights holders, with 
participants examining impacts of the investment regime on access to justice both within and outside 
the regime itself. Representatives of two communities affected by investments that gave rise to 
                                                     
7 Report of the Working Group on the issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, 
UN Doc A/72/162 (July 18, 2017). Available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/72/162.   
8 Ibid, paras. 13-17.  
9 Ibid, paras. 38-54.  
10 Ibid, para. 7.   
11 Ibid, paras. 18-25.   
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investor-state claims began the discussion by sharing their views on the specific investment impacts 
experienced or feared by these communities, their concerns about investor-state arbitration, and 
their efforts to seek justice for investment-related human rights violations and abuses.  
 
The first presentation focused on an indigenous community in South America and the effects of a 
mining project led by a foreign investor. Two community representatives explained how community 
members had been excluded from the entire investment process, from the negotiation stage to 
processes relating to the investor-state claim. Massive protests erupted when the company was given 
a license to operate by the state without sufficient consultation with the surrounding communities. 
The community representatives explained that many people who took part in the protests were 
unfairly detained and fined. After the government subsequently revoked permissions related to the 
proposed investment, the foreign investor brought an investor-state claim under an applicable 
investment treaty. Community representatives at the roundtable noted that their community 
continued to encounter frustrations during the investor-state arbitration process. The 
representatives explained that, while they were able to file a submission as amicus curiae, this did 
not equate to a meaningful form of participation in the dispute settlement process. Noting that the 
investor-state arbitration regime excluded them entirely, one representative asserted: “if you believe 
amicus works, that is false.” The representative explained that, to present as an amicus, they had to 
have a neutral position, which felt impossible. According to this same representative, the investor-
state process did not allow indigenous peoples to meaningfully participate, and did not protect them 
or allow the affected communities to obtain a remedy in an effective manner. A community 
representative also highlighted that, despite the profound and direct impacts of the claim on the lives 
of community members, the dispute was determined in an environment that was not conducive to 
the community’s participation. The participant noted: “[t]hey were talking about my land, my 
territory, my life, my existence, but I didn’t have a voice.” The representatives also noted that some 
community members affected by the investment and related claim were not even aware of the 
process taking place, or of the implications that might result from the tribunal’s determination. A 
participant pointed out that community representatives were disheartened by the investment and 
dispute process, as they were left out of every stage of decision-making around the land and natural 
resources that they consider their sanctuary, their source of medicine, their place to pray, and, in 
some sense, their life.  
 
The second presentation related to another mining project in a different South American country. 
Two community representatives explained that the people who stood to be affected by the project 
were never consulted, and that community members and civil society advocates involved in opposing 
the project were subjected to violent repression by groups hired by the company, and were also 
criminalized. They noted that one of their fellow community members had gone through dozens of 
trials, whereas the company, which had attacked their way of life and their human rights, had not 
been brought to account. They explained that, despite the wrongful conduct on the part of the 
investor, the investor ultimately recovered damages in its successful investor-state claim. The 
community representatives underscored the unjust nature of this outcome, and expressed disbelief, 
noting: “it’s not possible that they then win money after having created so much harm in our territory 
and amongst our people.” The community representatives criticized the deeply exclusionary nature 
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of the international investment regime: not only did it fail to adequately consider the harms suffered 
by communities, but in this case, the regime validated violations of human, environmental, and 
constitutional rights.   
 
Following these remarks, participants proceeded to discuss the ways in which investment treaties 
and investor-state arbitration can affect rights holders’ access to justice within and outside the 
investment regime. During the course of the discussion, participants examined different judicial and 
non-judicial means of accessing justice that are available to investment-affected rights holders, and 
the ways in which the international investment regime may restrict, undermine, or otherwise affect 
these means of accessing justice. Participants acknowledged from the outset that certain implications 
of the investment regime for access to justice may be more difficult to identify and track than others, 
particularly given the continuing lack of transparency that permeates the investment regime at the 
treaty and contract or project levels. Improvement of transparency and monitoring efforts could help 
to clarify some of these implications, along with related solutions.   
 
Investor-state arbitration is exclusionary  
 
Participants agreed that, within the investment law framework, opportunities for individuals and 
communities affected by investment to access justice do not currently exist. Investor-state 
arbitration does not allow investment-affected rights holders to meaningfully participate in 
proceedings or intervene as third parties. Not only is investor-state arbitration exclusionary, it also 
is often not transparent, meaning that, in many cases, little or no information regarding claims and 
awards is released to investment-affected rights holders, or to the public more generally. Even if 
information is available, it is often in English, which may not be (widely) spoken within the interested 
or affected communities.   
 
While investment-affected rights holders can, in some cases, seek to make submissions to investor-
state tribunals as amicus curiae, participants agreed that this form of purported participation 
provides neither an effective nor practical means of accessing justice for either state violations or 
company abuses exacerbated or caused by international investments. Participants with direct 
knowledge or experience of the amicus process noted that communities are generally far removed 
from investor-state arbitration proceedings, and that participation as amicus curiae is complex, 
resource intensive, and lacks sufficient space and support for investment-affected rights holders to 
meaningfully voice concerns or seek to assert their rights.12 Moreover, access to this form of 
participation is granted by investment tribunals, which have the discretion to determine whether to 
accept or reject submissions as amicus curiae. A number of participants noted that, in many cases, 
tribunals have either rejected applications to file amicus submissions, or they have given limited 
consideration to the information put forward in accepted submissions.13   
                                                     
12 See also Report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on the rights of indigenous peoples on the impact 
of international investment and free trade on the human rights of indigenous peoples, UN Doc A/70/301 (August 7, 2015)  
<http://unsr.vtaulicorpuz.org/site/images/docs/annual/2015-annual-ga-a-70-301-en.pdf>. 
13 For discussion of community perspectives in investor-state claims, see Lorenzo Cotula and Mika Schröeder , “Community 
Perspectives in Investor-State Arbitration,” International Institute for Environment and Development (June 2017) < 
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Several participants also noted that information asymmetries undermine the ability of investment-
affected rights holders to assert their rights in the context of investor-state disputes. Due to 
challenges investment-affected rights holders face in accessing information about the content of the 
law (which arises from continued lack of transparency in the investor-state arbitration system 
generally, language barriers, and other challenges), and challenges in accessing information about 
the specific disputes, even those granted permission to participate as amicus curiae may face 
significant hurdles in ensuring their participation is effective. 
 
These issues are relevant not just for outcomes of specific disputes, but also for how cases are 
understood, and how investment “law” develops. Barriers to participation limit how the investments, 
conflicts and concerns are recounted to tribunals and subsequently reflected in arbitral awards, the 
formal legal records of the cases, and documents which may have persuasive effect in other, similar 
disputes. Exacerbating problems created by limited inputs into proceedings is the fact that the facts 
and law as reflected in the outputs – the awards – may be made public only in parts, causing those 
awards to reflect a record of incidents, causes, and effects that are very different from what affected 
communities might have perceived and experienced. One participant provided the example of  
Copper Mesa v. Ecuador,14 where even the award itself was heavily redacted in areas that described 
the company’s activities.  
 
Beyond investor-state arbitration, participants also noted the exclusionary nature of the investment 
treaty negotiation process itself. There is little or no opportunity for input from, or meaningful 
consultation of, those whose rights may be affected by these treaties. This may be one reason why 
investor-state arbitration itself has been designed to be so asymmetrical. 
 
Stalling, ending, or otherwise undermining remedies obtained by rights holders  
 
Participants noted that the threat of investor-state arbitration, or actual arbitration proceedings, 
might have the impact of directly stalling, ending, or otherwise undermining remedies or other 
justice measures obtained by rights holders in other fora, such as domestic courts. Roundtable 
participants discussed, for example, the lengthy series of claims involving Chevron, Ecuador, and the 
Lago Agrio plaintiffs, in which the company sought to obtain interim measures (and ultimately an 
award) precluding enforcement of domestic awards obtained by affected communities for 
environmental harms caused by an investment.15  
                                                     
http://pubs.iied.org/12603IIED/>. See also CCSI, Submission as an ‘Other Person’ in Bear Creek Mining Corporation v. Peru 
(July 9, 2016) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2016/08/Bear-Creek-v-Peru-ARB-14-21-Written-Submission-CCSI.pdf>.  
14 Copper Mesa Mining Corporation v. Republic of Ecuador (PCA No. 2012-2), Award (March 15, 2016) 
<https://www.italaw.com/cases/4206>.  
15 Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Corporation v. The Republic of Ecuador (II) (PCA Case No. 2009-23). For a 
summary of the Lago Agrio claims, see Business & Human Rights Resource Centre, “TexacoChevron Lawsuits re Ecuador,” 
<https://business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador>. Chevron also brought another investor-
state claim against Ecuador (Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. The Republic of Ecuador (I), PCA Case 
No. 34877). In August 2018, the tribunal issued an award in favor of Chevron. See Chevron Corporation and Texaco 
Petroleum Company and The Republic of Ecuador (II), PCA Case No. 2009-23, Second Partial Award on Track II (August 30, 
2018), paras. 9.22, 9.24 in particular.  
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It is possible that the threat of arbitration might also influence domestic court rulings. One 
participant provided an example of a case in Guatemala, where a local community opposed a 
hydroelectric dam project through judicial proceedings. A court in Guatemala ruled that proper 
consultations had not been carried out, and suspended the project. The company reportedly 
threatened arbitration;16 a subsequent court ruling lifted the suspension, while acknowledging that 
consultation still had to be carried out.17  
 
In addition to the potential for the international investment regime to undermine domestic or other 
claims brought by investment-affected rights holders, roundtable participants also discussed the 
possible effects of settlements of investor-state disputes.18 Participants noted the potential for 
negative impacts of settlement processes on access to justice if, for example, a state agrees to waive 
all claims against the investor as part of a settlement. Questions were raised by participants regarding 
the legal implications of waivers, the effects they may have on claims brought by third parties against 
investors, and whether such waivers might then be incompatible with the respective obligations and 
responsibilities of states and investors.  
 
Victimization and criminalization of community members 
 
Participants noted that community members involved in opposition to investment projects are often 
victimized by host states and investors, including by way of criminalization. Participants questioned 
whether the investment regime may exacerbate the potential for repression and criminalization of 
rights holders. For example, the high costs associated with investor-state arbitration, both material 
and reputational, may incentivize host states to crack down on opposition to international 
investments in order to avoid costly investor-state claims and even costlier liability. Indeed, tribunals 
have found governments liable for failure to protect an investment in the context of protests.  
 
One example discussed by the group was Copper Mesa v. Ecuador, where participants noted that local 
communities have suffered victimization and criminalization based on their efforts to protect their 
rights and interests, and have so far been unable to access remedy for the harms they have suffered. 
Community members filed a lawsuit in Canada against the company and others, alleging that they 
suffered displacement, injuries, death threats, and other intimidation by private security forces hired 
by Copper Mesa;19 the case was eventually dismissed, with the dismissal affirmed by an appellate 
                                                     
16 “Hidroeléctrica Oxec podría recurrir a arbitraje internacional,” El Periodico (April 28, 2017) 
<https://elperiodico.com.gt/inversion/2017/04/28/hidroelectrica-oxec-podria-recurrir-a-arbitraje-internacional/>. 
17 “La Corte de Constitucionalidad de Guatemala le permite a la hidroeléctrica Oxec seguir trabajando,” El Economista (May 
27, 2017) <http://www.eleconomista.es/energia/noticias/8388042/05/17/La-Corte-de-Constitucionalidad-de-
Guatemala-le-permite-a-la-hidroelectrica-Oxec-seguir-trabajando.html>.  
18 For further discussion of the settlement of investor-state disputes, see Lise Johnson and Brooke Skartvedt Guven, “The 
Settlement of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of Democratic Accountability and the Public Interest,” Investment Treaty 
News (March 13, 2017) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/03/ITN-The-Settlement-of-Investment-Disputes-Mar-13-
2017.pdf>.   
19 Ramirez and Ors v Copper Mesa Mining Corporation, TSX Inc, TSX Group Inc. and Ors. Statement of Claim, Ontario Superior 
Court of Justice (March 3, 2009) <http://www.ramirezversuscoppermesa.com/statement-of-claim.pdf>.   
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court. They did win one small victory of sorts, although it did not amount to any form of remedy: the 
company was eventually delisted from the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). 
 
Allocation of state resources  
 
Participants noted that international investment law can lead states to prioritize the allocation of 
resources towards investor protection. Investment treaties can operate in a context where power 
asymmetries already exist: investors have access to and favorable attention from government, while 
communities are marginalized and forgotten, if not victimized. Thus, introducing a system in which 
the government feels that international law requires it to devote even more attention to the interests 
of investors is particularly problematic. One participant noted, for example, that material resources 
and political weight have often been dedicated to creating and maintaining high-level institutional 
structures that are specifically established to support and address the concerns of foreign investors. 
While this is not itself problematic, such allocation of resources might occur while human rights 
monitoring and enforcement bodies remain under-resourced, and local communities do not have a 
similarly powerful advocate within the government. The pressure that investor-state arbitration 
places on governments to respond to and resolve investor concerns therefore can (further) tilt 
allocation of state resources and power towards initiatives that support investors, and away from 
agencies or bodies that hear the concerns of and protect the interests of rights holders, an outcome 
that could negatively impact rights holders’ access to justice.   
 
Regulatory chill and other disincentives 
 
Participants noted that investment treaties, and investor-state claims brought by investors on the 
basis of those agreements, can create a “chill” on the adoption or enforcement of regulations or other 
measures that may, directly or indirectly, have a negative impact on investments or otherwise affect 
the expectations of an investor. While investment treaties do not directly prohibit the adoption of 
measures necessary for a state to comply with its human rights obligations—and more recent 
treaties may include “right to regulate” clauses that purport to protect the regulatory flexibility 
needed by states to regulate in the public interest—these agreements can nevertheless discourage 
states from adopting or enforcing important regulations or measures.  
 
While it is difficult to document the impacts of regulatory chill, participants pointed to examples of 
states adjusting policies in response to investor concerns, or to the threat of arbitration by investors. 
One participant provided the example of Indonesia, noting that the government reportedly backed 
down from introducing new environmental laws when companies threatened claims.20 Such 
anecdotal evidence also squares with observations from investment law insiders.21  
                                                     
20 When Indonesia attempted to ban open-pit mining in protected forests, mining companies threatened to launch 
investment disputes under the Australia-Indonesia and UK-Indonesia BITs. Indonesia reportedly backed down and 
exempted foreign investors from the proposed ban, despite analysis that the claims were unlikely to win. See Stuard G. 
Gross, “Inordinate Chill: Bits, non-NAFTA MITs and Host-State Regulatory Freedom-An Indonesian Case Study.” Mich. J. Int’l 
L. 24: 893 2002, 895.  
21 See, for example, David Schneiderman, Kyla Tienhaara, and Gus Van Harten, “Reply to EFILA,” Investor-State Dispute 
Settlement – Comments and Observations: Gus Van Harten (July 6, 2015) 
 14 
 
With respect to the impact of regulatory chill that might affect access to justice for rights holders, 
participants noted that governments may be dissuaded from enacting regulations or otherwise 
taking actions that would increase access to justice in some way. If, for example, new environmental 
laws would provide greater redress mechanisms for environmental harms, then the decision not to 
enact such laws might result in fewer opportunities for redress.  
 
Participants also noted that investment law protections might also make it more expensive or 
complicated for governments to enact progressive human rights measures that might be required as 
a remedy. For example, if a domestic court or human rights tribunal required the restitution of lands 
or territories, the government may be discouraged from complying with the determination if doing 
so could in turn result in an investor-state claim. Alternatively, the government might seek to comply 
in the narrowest way, which may limit the effectiveness of the remedy obtained.  
 
3. Reform Options Discussed   
 
Participants noted that multiple proposals for reform of the investment regime and strengthening of 
the human rights regime, particularly in the context of business-related abuses, have been advanced 
in recent years. With respect to the international investment regime, these proposals range from 
revising investment treaty standards to establishing an “investment court” or providing for 
alternatives to investor-state arbitration. With respect to the human rights regime, some 
stakeholders have argued for the adoption of a binding international instrument to regulate the 
activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human rights; 
others have advocated for the use of international arbitration to seek remedies for business-related 
human rights abuses. Many have increasingly emphasized the role that home states can and should 
play in ensuring that the rights of investment-affected people in the host state are respected, 
protected, and fulfilled. Calls for human rights impact assessments (HRIAs) of investment treaties 
have also become more common.  
 
Building on discussions regarding the impacts of the investment regime on access to justice for rights 
holders, the second roundtable session was dedicated to a discussion of ways forward. In particular, 
participants sought to assess whether and to what extent existing proposals for reform were likely 
to address the implications of investment treaties and investor-state arbitration for rights holders’ 
access to justice. The key takeaways below synthesize recommendations put forward during these 
discussions. Ideas discussed ranged from smaller adjustments to more ambitious reforms. 
Roundtable participants agreed that a number of efforts, achievable in the shorter and longer term, 
are needed to address the impacts of the investment regime on access to justice.  Several participants 
also stressed the need for structural change to address the inequality inherent in the means and 
mechanisms available to investment-affected rights holders to access justice for abuses and 
                                                     
<https://gusvanharten.wordpress.com/2015/07/> (among other points, quoting Toby Landau, a leading arbitration 
attorney who stated that regulatory chill “definitely exists, and there’s palpable evidence of it. There are those who deny it, 
but I can say that, in my role as counsel, on a number of occasions now, I’ve actually been instructed by governments to 
advise on possible adverse implications or consequences of a particular policy in terms of investor-state cases.”).  
 15 
violations caused or exacerbated by international investments, as compared to the means and 
mechanisms available to investors to enforce investor protections under investment treaties.   
 
Explore informed alternatives to the current approach to investment protection  
 
Participants noted that, in recent years, several states have terminated their investment treaties and 
withdrawn from the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention). Bolivia, Ecuador, Indonesia, India, and South Africa, for 
example, have terminated some or all of their investment treaties in an effort to renegotiate these 
agreements from a clean slate and/or adopt alternative approaches to investment protection, 
including improvement of domestic frameworks applicable to inward investment. It was noted that 
States (such as Brazil) that have adopted alternative approaches to investment governance that do 
not provide for investor-state arbitration illustrate the potential for modes of investment governance 
that do not extend to investors the option of investor-state arbitration.  
 
To the extent that the current model of investor-state arbitration under the investment law regime 
affects access to justice, the implementation of alternative approaches to investment protection that 
do not include an arbitration option provides an obvious way to address access-to-justice concerns. 
Participants underscored, however, the need for greater support for states that want to opt out of the 
traditional approach to investment protection in favor of other alternatives. In this regard, several 
participants highlighted the importance of political mobilization, noting the ways in which 
mobilization in certain countries has begun to shift public opinion and political calculations around 
investor-state arbitration.  
 
Reform investment treaty standards  
 
To the extent states continue to engage in concluding investment treaties, there are various options 
to consider. As noted above, one widely suggested option was to drop investor-state arbitration. If 
investor-state arbitration were not dropped, other options regarding reform of that mechanism were 
discussed. Whether or not investor-state arbitration is retained, participants noted that it will be 
critical to reform investment treaty standards. A number of suggestions were made in this regard.  
 
Some participants noted that states should include provisions requiring compliance with human 
rights norms and standards in their investment treaties. These could include investor obligations 
regarding human rights due diligence and HRIAs, with reference to clear methodologies. Investors 
unable to establish compliance with human rights obligations could be precluded from treaty 
coverage and, if investor-state arbitration were included in the treaty, from raising claims against 
states.  
 
For states interested in including specific investor obligations in investment treaties, one participant 
pointed to two model agreements – the South African Development Community (SADC) Model 
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Bilateral Investment Treaty Template22 and the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development.23 It was also 
mentioned that the Morocco-Nigeria BIT, which includes several provisions that mirror the SADC and 
IISD models, includes some provisions regarding investor obligations, and is notable for its departure 
from the traditional approach of including only voluntary investor commitments. This agreement 
explicitly provides for a number of investor obligations applicable to both the pre- and post-
establishment phase of the investment, including regarding impact assessments, labor standards, 
and human rights.24   
 
Other potential reforms discussed included narrowing the scope of protections provided to investors. 
It was noted, for instance, that aligning investment treaties with human rights law requires that 
states refrain from the inclusion of certain provisions, such as umbrella clauses that could be used to 
enforce stabilization provisions. Another suggestion was to add exception clauses that allow 
governments to derogate from investment treaties in certain circumstances.25  
 
Participants also discussed ways in which treaties could be more effectively designed to address 
barriers in access to justice caused or exacerbated by business activities. Participants generally 
agreed, for example, on the importance of including treaty requirements regarding liability of 
investors in the home state; technical cooperation and capacity building programs to ensure host 
state courts can provide access to justice; and provisions regarding insurance or civil liability 
schemes, especially in the context of hazardous activities. 
 
Regarding the suggestion for enhanced insurance protections, participants discussed the 
appropriateness of certain models of insurance protection, including political risk insurance, private 
insurance, or state insurance. One participant pointed out that such mechanisms may create 
obligations for insurers to respect human rights through the offering of new products. Another 
participant brought up the costs related to investment-related human rights violations and the 
possibility that companies already include such calculations when they conduct risk management. It 
was pointed out that an ILO Maritime Labour Convention had the impact of changing insurance 
schemes for enhanced human rights protection in the shipping industry. Participants generally 
agreed that further examination was needed to assess the applicability of similar approaches in the 
investment regime.  
 
                                                     
22 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty Template of the South African Development Community (2012),  
<www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/sadc-model-bit-template-final.pdf>.  
23 IISD Model International Agreement on Investment for Sustainable Development (April 2005), 
<https://www.iisd.org/pdf/2005/investment_model_int_agreement.pdf>.  
24 Reciprocal Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco and 
the Government of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (signed 3 December 2016), arts 14-20.  
25 For discussion of this option, see e.g., Barnali Choudhury, “Exception Provisions as a Gateway to Incorporating Human 
Rights Issues into International Investment Agreements” 59 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law, 670; Report of the 
Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, UN doc A/HRC/33/42/E, August 11, 2016); CCSI, “Outcome Report 




Reform investor-state arbitration  
 
Where states choose to retain investor-state arbitration in investment treaties, steps taken to reform 
dispute settlement should address the impacts of the current approach on investment-affected rights 
holders.  
 
Participants discussed, for example, the importance of transparency and participation of rights 
holders in investment negotiations and investor-state arbitration. One participant noted the 
importance of further efforts to promote transparency throughout arbitral proceedings. While some 
advances have been made in recent years, including the adoption of the UN Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Rules on Transparency in Treaty-Based Investor-State 
Arbitration and the related “Mauritius Convention on Transparency,” many investor-state claims 
continue to be determined behind closed doors, even if awards are eventually made public. 
Additionally, other arbitral institutions such as ICSID have yet to update their rules regarding 
transparency.26 Participants agreed that proceedings must be conducted in an open and transparent 
manner. Several participants suggested taking additional steps to make proceedings and case 
materials more accessible to those affected by the investor-state  proceedings, including by 
translating materials and hearings into local language, and having hearings take place within the host 
country.  
 
It was also said that, in cases when the rights or interests of a non-party are likely to be affected by 
the proceedings, that non-party should have the right to join as a party, and if such a party cannot be 
so joined, the proceedings should be dismissed. 
 
Participants also discussed inclusion of treaty language expressly requiring investors to exhaust 
domestic remedies before seeking investor-state arbitration. It was said that this could, among other 
impacts, better ensure disputes are heard in domestic fora more accessible to a broader range of 
stakeholders. It was additionally suggested that investment treaties should contain language 
governing settlement, and preventing settlement of investor-state arbitration claims or 
counterclaims that purport to waive or determine claims of non-parties to the dispute. 27  
 
Participants also discussed concerns regarding the backgrounds and qualifications of arbitrators 
appointed to investor-state tribunals. Several participants noted the need for reform of rules 
regarding appointment of arbitrators to address concerns regarding impartiality and conflicts of 
interest. Suggestions were also made regarding changes to qualification criteria for arbitrators, 
including requirements for expertise in human rights law, in order to address broadly held concerns 
regarding determination of claims with human rights dimensions by those without expertise in 
                                                     
26 For suggestions regarding reform of ICSID’s rules concerning transparency, see e.g, CCSI’s Submission (March 31, 2017), 
pp. 2-4 <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/04/ICSID-Rule-Revisions-Comment-31-March-17-FINAL.pdf>.  
27 For further discussion of settlements and counterclaims, see Lise Johnson and Brooke Skartvedt Guven, “The Settlement 
of Investment Disputes: A Discussion of Democratic Accountability and the Public Interest,” Investment Treaty News 
(March 13, 2017) <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/files/2017/03/ITN-The-Settlement-of-Investment-Disputes-Mar-13-
2017.pdf>.   
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human rights law. Participants noted the importance of promoting greater inclusion of human rights 
law experts amongst the pool of arbitrators determining investor-state claims if human rights 
provisions are to be used to temper the impacts of investment treaties on the rights of third parties.    
 
Related to these questions concerning who adjudicates the disputes, participants discussed the 
European Commission’s proposed “investment court,” noting concerns regarding the extent to which 
the proposal would address the actual or potential impacts of investment law on access to justice for 
investment-affected rights holders or, more generally, the broader criticisms regarding the 
illegitimacy and asymmetrical nature of the investment regime. Several participants noted that the 
court would continue to provide investors with a unique form of remedy at the international level, 
and would institutionalize many of the current failings of the regime, without expanding access to 
the mechanism to third parties. Moreover, referring to the mechanism as a “court” may lend 
legitimacy to a system that is not fundamentally different to investor-state arbitration, and could 
have an overall negative impact of crystallizing the current approach to investment protection.  
 
Discussions of reform also included reference to ongoing dialogues in multilateral fora, including at 
UNCITRAL. In 2017, UNCITRAL’s Working Group III began exploring possible reform of investor-
state arbitration.28 One participant explained that UNCITRAL provides a forum for governments to 
negotiate rules on investor-state arbitration, and that states and civil society organizations with 
concerns about the system should follow and try to attend these meetings to have an impact on these 
discussions.29 Participants underscored the need to give a voice to investment-affected rights holders 
in the global dialogue on reform of the investment regime. Several participants also highlighted the 
need to link discussions taking place in human rights fora, including with respect to the draft binding 
instrument on transnational corporations and other business enterprises with respect to human 
rights, to discussions taking place in fora dedicated to reform of the investment regime. Other 
relevant processes include ICSID’s efforts to revise its arbitration rules.30 
 
Empower rights holders   
 
It was widely noted that, absent significant changes to the international investment regime, rights 
holders’ access to justice will continue to be at risk. There was thus a general consensus among 
participants that rights holders need to be empowered within the investment law framework. This 
would include greater transparency and access to information regarding investment treaty 
negotiations and disputes under concluded agreements, as well as corresponding opportunities for 
meaningful participation in the design of investment treaties and the conduct of investment disputes.  
                                                     
28 UNCITRAL, Working Group III, “2017 to present: Investor –State Dispute Settlement Reform” 
<http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/3Investor_State.html>.   
29 For example, CCSI has made several submissions to UNCITRAL with recommendations regarding the rights and interests 
of non-parties, disclosure, terms of settlement, waiver, see CCSI, “Submissions to UNCITRAL Working Group II on 
Arbitration and Conciliation”, <http://ccsi.columbia.edu/2013/02/05/submissions-to-uncitral-working-group-ii-on-
arbitration-and-conciliation/>.  
30 CCSI submitted comments to the ICSID Secretariat regarding proposed revisions of the ICSID arbitration rules in March 




Greater transparency and access to information is only beneficial when such information can be used. 
Participants discussed ways in which communities could be supported in better understanding 
relevant investment rules and procedures, and their implications. Participants suggested that this 
could be achieved through workshops within communities that stand to be affected, as well as 
through the creation and provision of literature on the topic in relevant native languages. This could 
also include peer-to-peer learning, whereby communities that have already felt impacts of both 
investment projects and related investment arbitration or threats thereof could share their 
experiences and insights with other communities.   
 
Participants suggested that citizens’ rights to participate and be consulted in the context of 
investment treaty negotiations need to be strengthened. While this is not yet the norm for treaty 
negotiations in all countries, citizen participation and consultations should be effective, inclusive, and 
continuous; these should preferably take place before key decision-making stages in the investment 
treaty negotiation process.  
 
Develop and implement effective monitoring strategies  
 
Participants noted the importance of strengthening documentation of the impacts of investment 
projects on rights holders. Stronger documentation of investment projects can help create an 
evidence base that may be useful for affected rights holders that seek to challenge projects, and may 
also be relevant for investment disputes linked to the relevant projects. One community 
representative noted that the community with whom he worked began to document its situation as 
soon as a company moved onto its territory. This documentation greatly assisted the community in 
describing its interactions with the company and demonstrating the impact of the project. This was 
relevant when seeking to intervene in an ongoing investment arbitration.  
 
Participants discussed various existing databases containing relevant information about investments 
and their impacts, and whether datasets could be merged in some way to provide a fuller picture of 
investment impacts. Stronger documentation of investment disputes and their impacts would also 
help clarify whether access to justice impacts would be addressed in specific proposals to modify 
investment and human rights legal regimes. Several participants noted the difficulties associated 
with documenting the impacts of the investment regime, including regulatory chill, and noted that 
much more could be done by researchers, civil society organizations, academia, and others in this 
regard. Participants suggested creating a database to support the tracking of specific impacts of 
investment treaties on, for example, social conflicts in a particular region.  
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Enhance human rights enforcement mechanisms  
 
Participants examined several ways to enhance enforcement of human rights law, including through 
claims in home states, and the ongoing effort to develop an international legally binding instrument 
to regulate the activities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises. Strengthening 
enforcement of the legal protections afforded by human rights law was seen to be critical. However, 
without sufficient reform of the investment regime itself, it is unclear how much such efforts could 
mitigate the investment regime’s negative impacts on access to justice for rights holders. 
 
Break down silos 
 
Participants noted the need to raise awareness, amongst a range of stakeholders, of the investment 
regime’s impacts on public policy, human rights, and access on justice. Similarly, participants pointed 
to the need to help break down silos amongst stakeholders. Such stakeholders include lawyers and 
others working within the investment law system, investors, rights holders, and policy makers. Those 
within the investment law system, for example, could benefit from greater awareness of the impacts 
of investment law and investment disputes on rights holders’ access to justice. Similarly, if investors 
could be sensitized about negative impacts of their projects—which can play a role in community 
conflict and lead to eventual investor-state claims— these can be mitigated and avoided through 
careful project planning, negotiation, and implementation. Regarding rights holders, efforts to raise 
awareness of the impact of investment treaties on their rights and interests, as discussed above, could 
help them engage more meaningfully with other stakeholders on the question of potential reforms. 
For policy makers, improved awareness of the interconnectedness of international legal systems and 
related impacts could support more nuanced consideration of various reform options, and could also 
support their own efforts to address competing obligations.  
Conclusion 
 
The workshop reflected wide agreement among participants that actual or potential impacts of the 
investment law regime on access to justice for investment-affected rights holders further 
demonstrate the urgent need for reform of the investment regime and strengthening of 
accountability for business-related human rights abuses. Participants expressed concerns regarding 
whether the reform options proposed to date – both in terms of changes to the investment law system 
and initiatives to strengthen human rights law – would fully address the investment regime’s impacts 
on access to justice. The discussion illustrated the need for further research on both impacts and 
solutions, and it clearly underscored the strong need for investment-affected rights holders to have 
an active voice in the discourse on these issues.    
 
